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Chapter 3
Do firms sell forward for
strategic reasons? A test
based on the theory∗
3.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 1, electricity and gas industries used to consist of vertically
integrated monopolies, state-owned or not, operating under regulatory constraints.
In each country or region there was a single monopolistic importer in place, which
typically owned the transmission network and either sold directly to consumers or
to downstream distribution monopolies. One-to-one negotiations was the standard
of trade throughout the value chain and the different parties were typically subject
to long-lasting contractual relationships.
Short- and long-run efficiency considerations have led energy policy makers
worldwide to gradually restructure energy markets. A key feature has been the
vertical separation of production and transportation activities. This separation has
enabled the creation of spot commodity markets. The Pool in the UK, ISO in Califor-
nia, the real-time PJM market in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, ERCOT
in Texas, EPEXSPOT in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland are examples
in electricity; NBP in the UK, the Henry Hub in the US, the Zeebrugge Hub in
Belgium and TTF in The Netherlands are examples in natural gas.
*This chapter is based on van Eijkel and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2010).
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The 2000-2001 electricity crisis in California has revealed that the combined
prevalence of price risks and market power in energy markets may have fatal con-
sequences when risk-hedging mechanisms are absent (Bushnell, 2004). As a conse-
quence, in nowadays restructuring, it is widely held that spot markets must nec-
essarily be complemented with forward markets (Ausubel and Cramton, 2009). In
an attempt to aid firms to contract forward, platforms have been created where
property rights can more easily be transferred among the participants.1 In addition,
in some markets we have witnessed the creation of futures exchanges. Examples of
markets for electricity futures are CALPX in California and EEX Power Derivatives
in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland; ENDEX runs a market for natural
gas futures in The Netherlands, as well as markets for UK and Dutch electricity
futures.
Facilitating forward transactions has the potential to deliver social benefits on
two accounts. First, forward markets address the need of a firm to hedge risks. For-
ward contracts typically specify fixed delivery prices so risk-averse market partici-
pants can mitigate their exposure to price shocks in the spot market by acquiring a
portfolio of futures. Central results in the literature relate to the decisions of a com-
petitive risk-averse firm facing price uncertainty (see e.g Baron, 1970; Holthausen,
1979; and Sandmo, 1971). In the absence of a futures market, this type of firm turns
out to restrict its output relative to what the firm would produce under certainty.
The opening of a forward market restores the level of output that would prevail if
uncertainty were removed.
Forward markets can deliver further social benefits in situations where firms wish
to sell forward for strategic reasons. In their influential paper, Allaz and Vila (1993)
show that forward contracts confer competitive advantages to Cournot firms so,
even when there is no uncertainty at all about future market conditions, firms have
incentives to engage in forward trading. By selling futures contracts at a pre-specified
price, a firm ends up attaching a lower value to a high spot market price. As a result,
a firm that sells forward is indirectly committing to an aggressive behavior in the
spot market. This raises firm profitability, since competitors respond by adopting a
compliant spot market strategy. Selling forward exhibits however the characteristics
1One development in natural gas has been the creation of virtual hubs, for example the NBP
and TTF, as opposed to the more traditional physical hubs, like the Henry Hub and the Zeebrugge
Hub. A physical hub is a location where several pipelines come together, so that total physical
throughput is delivered at this point. By contrast, virtual hubs contain several entry and exit
points that are interconnected, which implies that not all the gas traded has to flow through a
single point in the pipeline system.
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of a prisoner’s dilemma. Because every seller has incentives to sell (part of) its
output forward, the resulting equilibrium aggregate production is higher (and the
price lower) than in the absence of a futures market.2
To the best of our knowledge, whether the forward market institution by itself
is successful on these two fronts at a time is not well understood yet. One obvious
reason for this lack of knowledge is that a great deal of the contracts we have observed
in gas and electricity markets has not been dictated by market forces but imposed
by the regulators in the form of gas release programs or vesting electricity contracts
(Borenstein, 2002; Wolfram, 1999). A second reason is that disentangling the two
rationales motivating firms to sell forward – strategic commitment and risk-hedging
– from the field data is, at least, methodologically challenging; in addition, it requires
a wealth of data on forward transactions. In the core of this chapter we propose an
empirical strategy to separate the various incentives behind the contract cover of
a firm. In the next chapter of this thesis we will apply this strategy to the Dutch
natural gas market.
Our methodology to test whether firms use forward contracts for strategic reasons
and/or for risk-hedging motives builds on the idea that commitment has value only if
it is (imperfectly) observable (Allaz and Vila, 1993; Kao and Hughes, 1997). Inspired
from this idea, we develop a model of the interaction of asymmetric risk-averse firms
that compete in a forward market before they set quantities in a spot market. The key
aspect of the modelling is that it introduces the extent to which forward positions are
observable (or correctly inferred from the forward price) as a structural parameter
that can be estimated provided there is variation in the number of participating
firms.
In real-world energy markets, it is reasonable to assume that rivals’ forward
positions may be difficult to observe. First, where they exist, markets for natural
gas and electricity futures are designed to be anonymous and this anonymity puts
impediments for the forward positions of each individual rival firm to be observed
with a reasonable precision. Second, even if in principle observation of the forward
price may help firms to infer the rivals’ aggregate forward position, the process
of (forward) price discovery is far from simple. This is because some (or all) of
the transactions in these markets are made over the counter (OTC) as organized
exchanges are often bypassed by the traders or totally lacking.3 OTC markets are
2The model of Allaz and Vila has been adapted to suit the particular organization of power
markets in the UK by von der Fehr and Harbord (1992), Powell (1993), Newbery (1998) and Green
(1999).
3Chapter 5 discusses in more detail the coexistence of OTC marketplaces and centralized ex-
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relatively non-transparent and price indices for these markets, typically provided
by broker associations of by specialized agencies, are based on a limited pool of
recent transactions. By construction, price indices are complex statistics so it is
unclear how much a participant in the market can learn about rivals’ deviations
from equilibrium play. Even if centralized futures markets are more transparent,
seen that arbitrage opportunities across the exchanges and the OTC markets are
not always fully exhausted, the existence of conflicting price signals (as the law of
one price fails) further troubles the quality of the inferences market participants can
make (see e.g. Anderson, Hu and Winchester, 2007; Bushnell, 2007).
Our model bridges between the extreme cases of full transparency (perfect ob-
servability of rivals’ forward positions) and complete opacity of the forward market
(no observability at all). By doing so, the model gains in flexibility to fit the data
and helps us understand the extent to which the forward market provides the players
with commitment possibilities.
We show how to estimate the model using data on total sales, forward sales,
churn ratios and numbers of producers and wholesalers. Identification of the key
parameter requires variation in the number of active wholesale firms. In the data
set we use in the following chapter this variation comes from entry of new players
in the market but in other studies the analyst could exploit variation in the number
of producers and wholesalers across regional/separated markets. The empirical test
exploits the effect that changes in the number of players has on the so-called inverse
hedge ratio –defined as the total-to-forward-sales ratio.4 Interestingly, for the linear
model this ratio is independent of demand intercept and marginal cost so firms with
similar aversion to risk hedge in the same way no matter their marginal costs of
production and the state of the demand.
In a nutshell, the identification arguments are as follows. The incentives of a firm
to trade forward are shaped by three forces. The first two, the risk-hedging effect and
the strategic effect, are pro-contracts. The third is a price effect that arises because
offering forward contracts lowers the spot price and, by arbitrage, the forward price
too. This price effect actually puts a downward pressure on firm’s (expected) profits
and therefore makes forward contracting less attractive.
When the forward market is relatively opaque so that players have a difficult
time to infer deviations from equilibrium play, the strategic effect is hardly present
and the contract cover of a firm is the outcome of trading off the risk-hedging effect
against the price effect. In that situation, as the number of competitors rises, the
changes in energy markets.
4To be precise, inverse hedge ratio = (spot sales + forward sales) / forward sales .
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residual demand of an individual firm becomes less susceptible to demand shocks.
Therefore, the incentive to hedge becomes weaker if more suppliers enter the market.
The price effect, by contrast, stays constant if the number of suppliers in the market
increases. As a result, by virtue of the first force, the inverse hedge ratio increases
in the number of competitors.
By contrast, if the forward market is relatively transparent so that price and/or
rival firms’ forward positions are regularly and precisely observed, in addition to the
risk-hedging and the price effects, the strategic effect plays a significant role. This
strategic effect turns out to be stronger as more players are around. This is because
the (marginal) gains from affecting the rivals’ spot market strategy rise with the
number of competitors. We show that the strategic effect may have a dominating
influence in which case inverse hedge ratios turn out to be decreasing in the number
of firms. This different impact of the number of firms on inverse hedge ratios in case
forward positions can correctly be forecast by the market participants constitutes
the source of identification of the strategic effect.
This chapter contributes to the literature that studies forward contracting of
(essentially) non-storable goods.5 Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that
not only risk-hedging is important for firms to sell contracts in Cournot markets.
Kao and Hughes (1997) discuss the role of the observability-of-forward-positions
assumption. Mahenc and Salanie´ (2006) demonstrate that selling forward may have
anticompetitive effects when firms compete in prices. Ferreira (2003) also encounters
anticompetitive effects when firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely
many moments prior to the opening of the spot market.6 Our model extends previous
work by examining an n-firm game with risk-averse players that are heterogeneous
in their marginal costs of production and in their aversion to risk. We explore two
variants of the model, one where firms observe demand shocks before the spot market
opens, and one where the spot market remains uncertain. Although we cannot find
closed-form solutions for the forward and spot sales of an individual firm, we derive
its equilibrium (mean) inverse hedge ratio. These ratios turn out to have similar
properties, the most important for our purposes that they fall in the number of
players when the forward market is sufficiently transparent.
5Natural gas can be stored more easily than electricity but the costs of doing so are relatively
high, so that for its most part production, delivery and consumption take place contemporaneously.
6See also Newbery (1998) and Green (1999), who study models where firms compete in the
spot market using supply schedules. These papers show that, owing to the multiplicity of equilibria
in supply functions, the optimal contract cover of a firm is intimately linked to the spot market
equilibrium actually played.
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There is also work that has focused more on forward and spot price differences
in energy markets than on a firm’s optimal contract cover. Longstaff and Wang
(2004) document significant risk-premia in electricity forward prices. Bessembinder
and Lemmon (2006) derive the equilibrium forward risk premium in a competitive
model of the interaction of producers and retailers in the absence of speculators.
Our work differs from these papers in that we consider market power on the supply
side. This allows us to address the issue of whether firms sell futures contracts to
hedge or to gain market power in the spot market.7
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a two-
period model of competition. In the first period, the forward market opens and
firms sell futures contracts. In the second period, the spot market opens, firms sell
quantities and delivery of all contracted and spot quantities takes places. This section
also presents the main empirical prediction of our model. We exploit the equilibrium
restrictions to develop an empirical strategy in Section 3.3. After having presented
how to test for the existence of a strategic motive to contract forward, we study
various extensions to our main framework. In Section 3.4, we generalize our model
by allowing for nonlinear demand and general increasing and concave firm utility
functions. Section 3.5 analyzes the magnitude of the error when applying the mean-
variance approach to solve for firms’ optimal inverse hedge ratio. In Section 3.6, we
study a variation of the basic model by assuming that firms cannot condition their
spot strategies on the demand realization. The chapter closes with a discussion of
the main results and some concluding remarks. The proof for the main proposition
of this chapter can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 A model of forward and spot contracting
Consider an oligopolistic market with n asymmetric risk-averse firms selling a homo-
geneous good. Firms are asymmetric on two accounts: they differ in their degree of
7An alternative, and complementary, approach to address this issue is to use controlled ex-
periments. In a recent paper, Brandts, Pezanis-Christou and Schram (2008) set up laboratory
experiments to study the efficiency effects brought about by the possibility of forward contracting.
Working with deterministic demand and cost parameters, risk-hedging can be, if not fully elim-
inated, at least significantly reduced. Brandts et al. observe that significant price decreases and
efficiency gains are obtained compared to the case in which only spot market trading is possible.
Additional experimental evidence on the pro-competitive effects of futures contracts is provided
by Coq and Orzen (2006). Ferreira, Kujal and Rassenti (2009) challenge this view and present
experimental evidence to suggest that forward contracts make collusion more likely. Their results
are in line with Liski and Montero (2006).
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risk-aversion and have different marginal costs of production. Firms can sell output
in the spot market; in addition, they can also sell (or buy) the good in a forward
market.8 Let si and xi be, respectively, firm i’s total spot and forward market sales;
the total output firm i supplies on the market will be denoted qi(= si + xi). The
marginal cost of production of a firm i is denoted ci.
9
We assume that market demand is random and given by the linear-normal spec-
ification
p = a− bQ+ ,  ∼ N(0, σ2), (3.1)
where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi denotes the aggregate output delivered to consumers and  is
a zero-mean random shock normally distributed with standard deviation σ.10 We
assume that the realization of  is observed when the spot market opens.11 At that
stage, a firm i chooses its spot sales si to maximize its spot market profits.
12
At the forward market stage, by contrast, firms are uncertain about the price
8Forward contracts are contracts traded in the OTC market, while futures contracts change
hands in centralized exchanges. Since both types of contracts serve the same objectives, we use
them interchangeably throughout the chapter.
9In the natural gas industry, on the supply side of the market we typically encounter producers
and wholesalers. The constant marginal cost assumption is probably a good approximation for
the costs of extraction and shipping incurred by producers. European wholesalers typically import
gas from producing countries such as Norway and Russia. Wholesalers have long-term take-or-pay
contracts with foreign producers. Take-or-pay contracts stipulate that the buyer pays for a pre-
specified minimum amount of gas, irrespective of whether the gas is actually taken (Masten and
Crocker, 1985). Take-or-pay contracts also include a variety of (daily and yearly) flexibility clauses
(Asche et al., 2002; IEA, 2002). These clauses provide wholesalers with the necessary flexibility
to adjust supply to demand shocks. Take-or-pay contracts are typically indexed to the oil price
so the constant marginal cost assumption is also reasonable. Moreover, because wholesalers book
import capacity assuming extreme weather conditions, transport capacity is typically not binding.
Pipelines also allow for line-pack, that is, for the increase in the amount of gas the system can carry
by temporarily raising its pressure.
10Even though producers and wholesalers may differ in that the latter face both price and cost
risk, in what follows we will not make a distinction between their economic problems. Note also
that in our linear model randomness of the demand is equivalent to randomness on the marginal
cost.
11This assumption is not necessary. It reflects the idea that firms are typically well informed
about the state of the demand when the spot market opens and use such a market to balance their
portfolios. Later in Section 3.6 we develop the case in which at the spot market stage firms are still
uncertain about the realization of . The main theoretical insights of the model generalize to such
case (see Proposition 3.2).
12In our application, the demand side of the market is made of domestic retailers and exporting
shippers. We do not model risk aversion on the demand side because retail prices in the Netherlands
and the surrounding countries are non-regulated and a great deal of the retail contracts have variable
prices (see e.g. von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010).
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that will prevail in the market. As a result, at that stage, a firm views its monetary
flow of profits as a random variable. We assume firms are risk averse and have
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions. Let pii be the realized
(forward and spot) monetary profits of a firm i. The utility function of a firm i is
u(pii) = −e−ρipii , where ρi > 0 denotes firm i’s degree of risk aversion.13 Denote
by F (pii) the distribution of the monetary profits pii of a firm i. (Note that this
distribution is endogenous and will be determined later.) Then a firm i will choose




For simplicity, future spot market profits are not discounted.14
Next, and central to our empirical strategy, we assume that whether firms ob-
serve each other’s forward positions is uncertain. To model this idea, we introduce a
Bernoulli random variable, denoted I, with parameter γ. If I = 1 forward positions
become observable to the players and then we get the standard Allaz and Vila (1993)
setting. By contrast, if I = 0 we obtain the case of unobservable forward trading, as
discussed by Kao and Hughes (1997).15 The parameter γ can then be interpreted as
the degree of transparency of the forward market. As mentioned in the Introduction,
another, and perhaps more compelling, interpretation of this parameter is that it
reflects the ability of firms to infer deviations from the equilibrium path by looking
at forward price changes.16
We further assume there is a fringe of outside speculators. These traders, which
are assumed to be risk-neutral, do not have transmission capacity rights so they
cannot physically deliver the commodity to the final customers. Speculators compete
13The case of risk-neutrality obtains when ρi → 0 for all i.
14As it will become clear later, monetary profits are not normally distributed so maximizing
(3.2) is not equivalent to maximizing the corresponding mean-variance specification. Section 3.5
analyzes the magnitude of the error when a firm’s optimal contract cover is determined using the
mean-variance approach.
15We model imperfect observability by assuming that firms either observe the (correct) forward
price or they miss it altogether. An alternative way to model imperfect observability is by assuming
that firms may observe forward prices that are wrong. In that case Bagwell (1995) shows that the
value of commitment is fully destroyed; van Damme and Hurkens (1997) show that Bagwell’s
striking result relies on an unnecessary restriction to pure strategies.
16Forward markets are to some extent opaque. Many transactions occur over the counter and
therefore are invisible to market participants. Forward price indices are published by brokers and
specialized information agencies. Firms may be able to infer rivals’ forward positions upon obser-
vation of those indices but the question is how well. We can think of γ as the fraction of times
the firms are able to forecast how deviations from the equilibrium forward sales will affect the spot
market price. In this sense, firms can be seen as been ignorant, or naive, 1− γ of the times.
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a` la Bertrand for the quantities offered in the forward market. We shall also assume
that pure financial traders observe sellers’ deviations from the equilibrium path. This
assumption is based on the idea that speculators take positions that increase their
exposure to risk in an attempt to (weakly) increase their wealth. As such, they have
perhaps the strongest incentives to follow upon the forward market developments.
For the model at hand, this assumption implies that a strong version of arbitrage
(off and on the equilibrium path) between forward and spot markets holds.17
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, firms put quantities in
the forward market. Then the Bernoulli variable I is realized and forward positions
become observable or not. Next, firms learn the demand shock . Finally, firms
compete in quantities in the spot market and total sales are delivered. We now solve
the game by backward induction.
3.2.1 Spot market stage
At the time the spot market opens, demand is certain and firm i chooses its spot
sales si to maximize its spot market profits:
pisi = (p− ci)si,
where p is the realized spot market price given in (3.1). For this, a firm i takes the
spot market strategies and, when observed, the forward positions of the rival firms
as given. In case of an opaque forward market, firm i makes a conjecture about the
forward sales of its competitors. 18 The spot market equilibrium turns out to be in
linear strategies. Putting the linearity of the strategies up front, we write the spot
market strategy of a firm i as
si = Ai +Bi, i = 1, ..., n. (3.3)
When I = 1, which occurs with probability γ, firms observe each other forward
positions. In that case, the realization of the spot market price can be written as
follows:
p = a+ (1− b
n∑
j 6=i
Bj)− bxi − b
n∑
j 6=i




17Ferreira (2006) studies the role of the observability assumption at length. He argues that it is
hard to reconcile the assumption that firms are not informed of the rivals’ forward positions with
the assumption that speculators observe deviations at the forward stage. As mentioned earlier, in
the real-world forecasting quantities sold upon observing forward price indices is far from trivial,
specially if firms are heterogeneous. Speculators are not gamblers but highly specialized investors
whose profit critically depends on the quality of the forecasts they make.
18We require the conjectures to be correct in equilibrium.
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where
∑n
j 6=1 xj is the sum of the actual forward positions of firm i’s competitors.


























Therefore, conditional on the forward positions being observable, the equilibrium






















2 + (f − ci)xi,
where f denotes the forward price.
When I = 0, which occurs with probability 1 − γ, firms do not observe each
other’s actions in the forward market. This implies that deviations of a firm i from
the equilibrium path go undetected by the rival players. In that case, the price in
the spot market is given by
p = a+ (1− b
n∑
j 6=i
Bj)− bxi − b
n∑
j 6=1






j 6=i xˆj is firm i’s conjecture about the rivals’ aggregate forward position.














Because firm i does not observe deviations from the conjectured (equilibrium) for-
ward sales of the rival firms, its spot market strategy is only affected by (a change








(n− 1)(a+ ci − bxˆi − b
∑n












As a result, conditional on the forward positions not being observed, the spot market









and the realized market price becomes
pI=0 =
a+ + ci +
∑n









2 + (f − ci)xi.
3.2.2 Forward market stage
At the forward market stage, firms sell (or buy) part of their total output in the
futures market to maximize their expected utility.19 Note that u(pii) = Iu(pi
I=1
i ) +
(1− I)u(piI=0i ). Using the expressions for the conditional profits derived above, the










where f() is the density function of the normal distribution with zero mean and
variance given by σ2.
A firm i picks its amount of forward sales xi to maximize its expected utility. It

































i = pii and ∂pi
I=1
i /∂xi =

























−bxi + (1− γ) bxi
2
+ γ









19We do not a priori restrict firms’ level of forward trading to be positive. However, in equilibrium
each firm will sell a non-negative amount in the forward market.



























The first term of this equation (after the integral sign) represents marginal utility
from (monetary) profit, while the term between parentheses is the marginal monetary
profit from selling futures contracts. A firm i chooses its amount of futures xi to make
the expected value of the product of marginal utility and marginal monetary profit
equal to zero.
The incentives of a firm i to sell forward are shaped by three forces. There is a
risk-hedging effect, a strategic effect and a price effect. The first two forces are pro-
contracts; the third one dampens the incentives to sell futures. These three forces
can actually be seen after taking a closer look at Equation (3.7). To see them more
clearly, it is useful to consider the two extreme cases of complete opacity (γ = 0)
and complete transparency (γ = 1) of the forward market.
When forward positions cannot be observed by the rivals the strategic effect is





















f()d = 0. (3.8)
In parenthesis we see the direct effect of selling forward on a firm’s monetary profits,
along with a second effect that goes via its own spot market strategy, si. This
joint effect is clearly negative and has a deterministic component and a random
component. The deterministic component, −bxi/2, constitutes a negative price effect
that is independent of the number of firms. A firm that puts one unit more in the
forward market cuts its spot sales by half a unit (see Equation (3.6)), so its total
sales increase. This results in a fall in the spot market price, which is anticipated
by the speculators and therefore the forward price falls too.20 This own price effect
dampens the incentives to put futures in the market, which explains why a risk-
neutral monopolist would choose not to engage in forward contracting at all (see
20The fall in the forward price originates from the assumption that speculators observe the
forward quantities (Ferreira, 2006). Since they anticipate a higher total quantity to be delivered
when the spot market closes, they correspondingly lower the prices they bid for the quantities on
sale in the futures market.
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Tirole, 2006, p. 216-17). Since this effect is always negative no matter the number
of firms, it is also true that a risk-neutral oligopolist would opt out of the contract
market (Hughes and Kao, 1997).
The random component explains the risk-hedging motive. Note that a firm that
increases its contract cover away from zero lowers its exposure to demand shocks by
/(n+1) (see Equation (3.8)). This random component is negatively correlated with
 and so is the marginal utility from monetary profit (since profit increases in  and
the utility function is concave). As a result, the covariance between marginal utility
and marginal profit is positive, giving rise to the risk-hedging incentive of selling
forward contracts. When contracts cannot be observed by the market participants,
the optimal contract cover of a firm i is the outcome of trading off the (positive)
risk-hedging motive against the (negative) price effect.
When forward positions are easily observable by the firms, or can easily be in-















f()d = 0. (3.9)
In this case there is a third, strategic, effect of selling futures. This effect also has
a deterministic component and a random component. Suppose the firms are risk-
neutral. By the strategic effect, a firm that puts units in the forward market positively
affects its profit via the spot market strategies of the rival firms. This gives firm i an
incentive to sell forward, since by doing so it benefits from rival firms’ cuts in their
spot sales (Allaz and Vila, 1993). The additional random term has a positive sign
and this implies that it works counter to the risk-hedging effect discussed above. This
is because, since the rival firms cut their spot sales, the effect of putting one unit
forward is less effective at lowering exposure to price shocks. However, the aggregate
random component in Equation (3.9) is still negative and decreasing in n. This tells
us that firms have an incentive to hedge against risk also in a transparent forward
market, but that the marginal gains from doing it become smaller the more firms
are around.
Obviously, the importance of the strategic motive depends on the likelihood
forward positions are learnt by the players. Moreover, because the risk-hedging and
the strategic effects of selling forward on a firm’s expected utility are intertwined, it
is now clear why it is difficult to disentangle them using data from the field. In the
remainder of this chapter, our main focus will be on the equilibrium inverse hedge
ratio of an individual firm i, defined as total-to-forward-sales (or qi/xi) ratio. Though
the forward and the spot sales of an individual firm cannot be computed explicitly,
we now show how one can easily derive the stochastic process of a firms’s inverse
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hedge ratio. This ratio has useful properties that we will exploit in the empirical
application.
After some algebra, the FOC given by (3.7) simplifies toa+∑
j 6=i






− 2bγ + b(n+ 1)(1− γ)




2bγ + b(n+ 1)(1− γ)
2(n+ 1)
= 0.
Solving for xi gives
xi =
2(b(n2 − 1)γ + 2ρiσ2)(a+
∑
j 6=i cj − nci − b
∑
j 6=i xj)
b(b(n+ 1)3 − b(n− 1)2(n+ 1)γ + 2(3 + γ + n(1− γ))ρiσ2) .















It will prove convenient to measure the relationship between forward and spot sales




b(n+ 1)2(n+ 1 + (n− 1)γ) + 2(3 + γ + (3− γ)n)ρiσ2




As can been seen from Equation (3.10), the inverse hedge ratio is normally dis-
tributed. The following proposition discusses some more properties of the equilibrium
inverse hedge ratio.
Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium, the mean of the inverse hedge ratio of a firm i,
defined as total-to-forward-sales ratio, is given by
Γi ≡
(n+ 1)2(n+ 1 + γ(n− 1)) + 2(3(n+ 1)− γ(n− 1))ρiσ2b
2(n+ 1)(γ(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2b )
. (3.11)
This mean of the inverse hedge ratio, Γi, satisfies the following properties:
(i) It is independent of the demand intercept parameter a and of the firm marginal
cost ci, but increases in the demand slope parameter b.
(ii) It decreases as the risk-aversion parameter of the firm ρi goes up, or as demand
volatility σ2 increases.
(iii) It decreases as the probability that forward positions are observed γ increases
(iv) There exists a critical parameter γ˜(n) such that: For all γ ≤ (≥)γ˜(n), Γi in-
creases (decreases) in the number of firms n.
Moreover, if firms are symmetric (ci = c, ρi = ρ for all i), the variance of the
inverse hedge ratio of the firms decreases in a, ρ and σ2, and increases in c, b and
in γ.
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The proof is in the Appendix.
The main properties of the inverse hedge ratio as stated in Proposition 3.1 need
some further explanation. First, the inverse hedge ratio does not depend on the
demand parameter a and the cost parameter ci. This means that firms with similar
risk aversion hedge in the same way on average, no matter how much they differ in
their marginal cost of production. In addition, it is interesting to see that inverse
hedge ratios in periods of demand expansion are similar to those in periods of demand
contraction. This result, of course, rests on the linearity assumptions of the demand
and cost functions. However, it should be seen as a reasonable approximation that
is useful because it allows us to estimate the model without cost and demand data.
Inverse hedge ratios go down when firms becomes more risk averse, when demand
uncertainty increases, or when the transparency of the forward market goes up. The
former two results are driven by the risk-hedging rationale: the higher the degree of
risk aversion (or the greater the uncertainty), the more a firm wants to hedge in the
forward market instead of selling spot. The latter is explained by the strategic motive,
since a high level of contract cover is worth more to a firm the more convincing the
commitment is.
The most interesting feature of the inverse hedge ratio, at least for our purposes,
is that whether firm entry/exit has an upward or downward effect on this ratio
depends on the extent to which the forward market is transparent. If the futures
market is relatively opaque and rivals’ futures contracts go often unobserved, the
strategic effect is hardly present and the contract cover of a firm trades off the the
risk-hedging effect against the price effect. In that situation the incentive to hedge
against demand shocks becomes weaker (see Equation (3.8)) if more suppliers enter
the market, which pushes up the inverse hedge ratio of an individual firm. This is
because demand uncertainty is revealed before the spot market opens and therefore
the demand shock is partly absorbed by the rivals’ spot strategies. As a result, the
residual demand of a particular firm at the spot stage is less susceptible to demand
shocks the higher the number of competitors. By contrast, the price effect appears
not to depend on the number of competitors (see Equation (3.8)). Therefore, it is
clear that when the forward market is relatively obscure, inverse hedge ratios increase
in the number of suppliers. For the extreme case of γ = 0 we in fact get
Γi(γ = 0) =
6ρiσ
2 + b(n+ 1)2
4ρiσ2
,
which goes up in n.
If the futures market is more transparent and the contract positions of the rivals
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are regularly observed, in addition to the risk-hedging effect and the price effect,
the strategic effect plays a significant role. Note from (3.9) that the strategic effect
becomes more prominent as more players are active in the market. This is because for
a firm the marginal gains from affecting its rivals’ spot market strategies are higher
the more competitors it faces. While the risk-hedging and the price effect (weakly)
decrease as the number of competitors increases, we show that the strategic effect
may have a dominating influence. For the extreme situation γ = 1, we obtain





b(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2 ,
which clearly decreases in n.
As shown in Proposition 3.1, for intermediate cases, the relationship between the
number of firms and the inverse hedge ratio depends on how likely it is that forward
positions will be observed. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The inverse hedge ratio and the number of firms (ρi = 4, σ
2 = 1, b = 1)
3.3 Empirical strategy
We seek to answer the question whether firms sell futures for strategic reasons,
for risk-hedging considerations, or for both. If firms’ forward positions were totally
opaque to the agents in the market, strategic reasons would not play any role and
therefore the observed inverse hedge ratios in the data would only be explained by
risk-hedging considerations. Answering this inquiry thus amounts to finding out the
extent to which firms can observe each other’s forward sales. Or, in different words,
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figuring out the ability of the players to forecast correctly the aggregate position of
the rivals’ upon observing the forward price/index.
If one were provided with firms’ forward and spot sales data corresponding to
various levels of observability and risk, one could estimate the effects of these two
factors on the hedge ratio. The problem with this approach is that these variables
are hard to measure. One could for example gather data from different regional
markets. Within-market price dispersion could be used as a measure of price risk.
However, it is not clear how to measure the extent to which firms are capable of
deducing deviations from changes in the forward price. The analyst would have to
make a priori assumptions about the observability parameter γ. Instead, we propose
to estimate the model in Section 3.2 structurally. In the next chapter, we do this for
the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas. For this market, we have obtained the
minimal set of data: forward and spot sales, churn ratios and number of producers
and wholesalers. We will now discuss the empirical approach that can be applied
when one collects a data set similar to the one we have for the Dutch gas market.
The variable of interest is the inverse hedge ratio of an individual firm i. As shown





b(n+ 1)2(1 + n+ (n− 1)γ) + 2(3 + γ + (3− γ)n)ρiσ2




We can rewrite equation (3.12) as
(n+ 1)q∗i =
(n+ 1)2(1 + n+ (n− 1)γ) + 2(3 + γ + (3− γ)n)ρiσ2b





Using individual firm level data on total quantities brought to the market, forward
sales and number of wholesalers, the system of equations in (3.13) can be fitted to
the data. Identifying assumptions are that the slope of the demand function b and
the demand volatility parameter σ are constant over the sample period; moreover,
we assume that variation in the number of players n is exogenous.21 Since these
equations are non-linear in the parameters of interest, one has to apply non-linear
least squares (NLS). Notice that the parameters ρi, σ and b cannot be separately
identified. However, with the appropriate (firm-level) data, one could estimate rel-
ative risk-aversion parameters across firms, i.e. ρi/ρj . The identification of these
21It may be argued that the number of players is determined jointly with the hedge ratios.
Economic theory suggest the demand and cost parameters as clear determinants of n. If this
dependence is not clearly controlled for by the variation in the forward sales of a firm xi, which
clearly depend on a and ci, then an endogeneity problem would arise. In the following chapter,
where we apply the empirical strategy to the Dutch gas market, we deal with this issue.
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parameters would stem from variation in the hedge ratios of the different firms. If
some firms were systematically seen to hedge more than others, this would provide
information on the extent to which the former firms have greater risk-aversion than
the latter.
The identification of the observability parameter γ stems from variation in the
number of wholesalers n. As shown above, when forward positions are relatively
transparent to the firms, the model predicts that an individual firm responds to
entry by decreasing its inverse hedge ratio. By contrast, if firms’ forward sales are
relatively opaque and rivals’ rarely observe them, then an individual firm increases
its inverse hedge ratio as a response to entry. It is precisely this differential effect
of entry that enables the identification of the observability parameter γ using data
containing variation in the number of players.
Unfortunately, due to confidentiality reasons, individual firm level data are often
not publicly available so one has to rely on aggregate forward and spot sales. To
work with this type of data, we proceed by aggregating at the market level. For this
we need to assume that all firms have similar risk aversion parameters, i.e., ρi = ρ
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where Γ(·) is the hedge ratio as defined in Proposition 3.1 for symmetric firms.
This equation can be fit to the data by applying NLS. In Chapter 4, we apply the
empirical strategy described above to the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas.
3.4 A general model of forward contracting
In this section, we show that the effects of forward contracting discussed in the
previous section carry over to a more general version of our basic framework. We
continue to have n firms producing a homogeneous good at constant (firm-specific)
marginal cost ci. Sellers now face the following general inverse demand function:
p = P (Q) + ,  ∼ (0, σ2),
where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi and  is a, not necessarily normally distributed, additive random
shock with zero mean and variance σ2. It is assumed that the deterministic part of
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the inverse demand function, P (Q), is twice differentiable, monotonically decreasing
in Q and (weakly) concave. Further, we maintain the assumption that firms get to
know the realization of the demand shock before the spot market opens.
Firm i chooses its forward position and spot sales so as to maximize its expected
utility, where utility is now represented by the function ui = Ui(pii), with U
′ > 0 and
U ′′ < 0. This function captures a wide range of risk preferences, including constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Again,
forward positions are observed only with probability γ.
3.4.1 The spot market stage
At the time the spot market opens, demand uncertainty is resolved and firm i chooses
its spot sales si to maximize its profits, given its own forward position and, if ob-
served, the forward strategies of its rivals. In case of observability, the system of n
spot market FOCs is given by
P
si + xi + n∑
j 6=i
(sj + xj)
+ − ci + P ′si = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (3.16)
Let {sI=1i }ni=1 denote the firms’ spot sales that solve this system of FOCs. When the
forward market institution is not transparent, the optimal spot outputs are given by
{sI=0i }ni=1 and solve the following system of FOCs:
P
si + xi + n∑
j 6=i
(sj + xˆj)
+ − ci + P ′si = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n, (3.17)
where xˆj denotes firms’ conjectures about the forward position of producer j.
To see how firm i affects its own spot output and the spot strategies of rival
firms by selling in a transparent forward market, we first differentiate the system of





2P ′ + P ′′s1 P ′ + P ′′s1 · · · P ′ + P ′′s1












· · · ∂sn
∂xi
]′
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and
b = [P ′ + P ′′s1 P ′ + P ′′s2 · · · P ′ + P ′′sn]′ .
Note that M can be written as M = G + H, where G = P ′I (I be-
ing the identity matrix) and H is a matrix of rank one with columns
[P ′ + P ′′s1 P ′ + P ′′s2 · · · P ′ + P ′′sn]′. Then from Miller (1981) we know that
the inverse of M can be written as
M−1 = (G + H)−1 = G−1 − 1
1 + g
G−1HG−1, (3.18)
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′ + P ′′sj
(n+ 1)P ′ + P ′′
∑n
i=1 si
, j = 1, 2, ..., n.




′ + P ′′sj
(n+ 1)P ′ + P ′′
∑n
i=1 si
< 0, j = 1, 2, ..., n, (3.19)
which tells us that firm i’s forward position has a negative effect on both firm i’s
own spot sales and the spot output of its competitors.
When the hedging decisions remain hidden, firm i’s forward output has no in-
fluence on the rivals’ spot strategies. To see how firm i adjusts its spot supply due





′ + P ′′si
2P ′ + P ′′si
< 0. (3.20)
3.4.2 The forward market stage
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j 6=i










sI=0i (xi) + n∑
j 6=i





 sI=0i + (f − ci)xi
are the full profit expressions at the forward stage. We retain the assumption that
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level of forward contracting solves






























i = si for all i yields
piI=1i = pi
I=0
i = pii and ∂pi
I=1
i /∂xi = ∂pi
I=0























Suppose that the strategic effect is not present, so γ = 0. Then, firm i trades forward

































P ′si + f − ci + ∂f
∂xi











where the last term yields the effect of forward sales on the forward price via the
change in speculators’ expectation of the spot output. Using the FOC at the spot

















Equation (3.21) can then be rewritten as follows:







xi = 0. (3.23)
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It is easy to see that the covariance term in equation (3.23), which represents the



















< 0.22 Now, provided that the spot price increases in the demand shock
(see Footnote 22), one obtains that Cov(U ′,−p) is positive.
Next, the second term of equation (3.23) represents the price effect. To find the




′ + P ′′si()
2P ′ + P ′′si()
> −1 ∀si ≥ 0.






P ′ + P ′′si




Now, given that an increase in the forward obligations pushes down the forward
price, so ∂f/∂xi < 0, the second term of Equation (3.23) becomes negative. This
shows the utility-reducing price effect of selling forward. Concluding, in case of an
opaque forward market firms sell forward only for risk-hedging reasons, though this
incentive is weakened by the negative price effect.
In case the strategic effect is present, we have γ = 1 and firm i then chooses the

















 = 0. (3.25)


















22To find the effect of the demand shock on the spot output, it is easily obtained that ∂si
∂
=









, where M−1i is the ith row of the matrix in (3.18) and
ι is the unit vector (of size n). Thus, the demand shock has a positive impact on firm i’s spot

















This implies that equation (3.25) can be rewritten as follows:
















The first and second term of (3.26) again represent the risk-hedging motive and neg-
ative price effect, respectively.23 The third term of the FOC represents the strategic
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Expanding this term is far from trivial, since it depends on more than two random
variables and, on top of that, some of these random variables enter in a rather
complicated way. However, if we assume that P ′′ = 0 and that P ′ is non-random, as








 = −E [U ′(·) (n− 1)P ′(si + xi)
n+ 1
]
= − (n− 1)P
′
n+ 1








We already obtained that
∂U ′
∂




> 0, so the covariance term in (3.28) becomes negative. Now, given that




the sign of the strategic effect is ambiguous. We get that (3.28) becomes positive as
long as marginal utility and spot output are not highly negatively correlated, which
at least holds for linear demand. If this is so, the strategic effect becomes positive
and provides firms an additional incentive to sell forward.
23Note though that the price effect is less strong when forward positions are observed, as
|∂sI=1/∂xi| < |∂sI=0/∂xi|.
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3.5 Mean-variance approximation
A commonly used approach to study an agent’s optimal behavior under risk aver-
sion is the mean-variance model. Its attractiveness lies in its relative simplicity and
its property to give linear demand functions for financial assets. Furthermore, as
long as an agent’s payoff is normally distributed the mean-variance approach yields
identical results as when determining an agent’s optimal choices under CARA util-
ity. Unfortunately, in case the monetary payoff is not normally distributed, like in
our framework, using the mean-variance model results in incorrect equilibrium con-
ditions if agents maximize a CARA utility function. In this section, we study the
magnitude of this error in the expected inverse hedge ratio, as this is our main
variable of interest.
In order to find the size of the error, we first derive the equilibrium results under
the mean-variance approach. Suppose firm i maximizes the mean-variance criterion:
Wi = E(pii)− ρi
2
V (pii), (3.29)
where ρi is again firm i’s risk-aversion parameter and E(pii) and V (pii) are the
expected value and variance of firm i’s profit, respectively. Since we still assume
that the realization of the demand shock takes place at the time the spot market
opens, firms’ spot strategies are the same as in equations (3.4) (when forward sales
become observable) and (3.6) (when forward sales remain unobserved). This implies
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= γb(sI=10 )
2 + (1− γ)b(sI=10 )2 +
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are, respectively, the deterministic parts of firm i’s spot strategy in case of observ-
ability and non-observability. The variance of the profit then becomes










+ (1− γ) (piI=0i − E(pii))2]










Substituting (3.30) and (3.31) into Equation (3.29) and maximizing the mean-
variance criterion with respect to xi yields the optimal forward sales for firm i:
xMVi =
2(bγ(n− 1)(n+ 1)2 + 2(n+ 1− (n− 1)γ)ρiσ2)
b(b(n+ 1)4 − bγ(n2 − 1)2 + 4(1 + γ + (1− γ)n)ρiσ2)
a+ n∑
j 6=i





The expected equilibrium inverse hedge ratio becomes
ΓMVi =
(n+ 1)2(n+ 1 + (n− 1)γ) + 4(n+ 1− (n− 1)γ)ρiσ2b
2(n− 1)(n+ 1)2γ + 4(n+ 1− (n− 1)γ)ρiσ2b
. (3.32)
The (mean of the) inverse hedge ratio under the mean-variance criterion has similar
properties as the ratio obtained in our basic framework: it decreases in γ, ρi and σ
2,
increases in b and goes down in n if γ is sufficiently large. To see the magnitude of
the error from using the mean-variance framework, we subtract (3.32) from (3.11)
to get
∆Γi = Γi − ΓMVi
=
2((n+ 1− (n− 1)γ)ρiσ2b )2




In case of no observability at all (γ = 0), the error becomes 1/2, irrespective of
the other parameter values. Our data reveals that this loss of accuracy seems to be
quite large, given that the inverse hedge ratio is usually between 1 and 2. However,
the size of the error goes down in γ. When there is full observability in the forward
market (γ = 1), the accuracy loss becomes









(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2b
)(
(n− 1)(n+ 1)2 + 4ρiσ2b
) . (3.33)
It can be seen from Equation (3.33) that in case forward positions are observed
with certainty, the error is smaller than 1/(n+1) and rapidly converges to zero when
n becomes large (relative to ρiσ
2/b). For γ being strictly positive, we also notice that
∆Γi increases in b and decreases in ρ and σ
2. Finally, to see how the loss of accuracy
changes in the number of firms, we add to Figure 3.1 the relationship between the
inverse hedge ratio and n for different values of γ under the mean-variance approach
(displayed by the dashed curves in Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 then shows that the error
becomes smaller when more firms enter the market; this effect is especially apparent
when the there is a high degree of observability.
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Figure 3.2: The inverse hedge ratio and the number of firms (ρi = 4, σ
2 = 1, b = 1)
We can compare our outcomes with the results obtained by Newbery (1988), who
investigates the loss of accuracy when futures sales and prices are derived using the
mean-variance model in case firm’s income is the product of two normally distributed
variables (i.e. a random spot price and random output). He shows that the error
in computing the hedge ratio is quite large (near 30 percent) when producers are
rather heterogeneous, the correlation between price and production is low and the
futures market is biased. We notice that Newbery studies a model where a firm’s
total output is exogenously given, which implies that it is not affected by the firm’s
forward position. Conversely, when determining the error in the (inverse) hedge ratio
in our case both the numerator and the denominator change. Furthermore, another
difference between Newbery’s analysis and our’s is that he considers a competitive
framework where producers cannot influence prices nor their rivals’ strategies while
our suppliers have market power.
3.6 Uncertain spot market
Until now, we have assumed that firms operate in the spot market in the absence of
uncertainty. Therefore, we have modeled a market where firms observe the demand
shocks before they decide how much gas to put in the spot market. Arguably, the
demand may still remain uncertain at that moment. In such a case, firms cannot
condition their spot strategies on the demand realizations. To see whether our results
depend on this assumption, we now develop a model in which firms do not observe
price shocks before the spot market opens. Of course, as before, the difference be-
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tween the forward and the spot market is that at the forward stage the firms can
lock-in a price for their forward quantities, while the price received for their spot
quantities is random.24
In this new setting, a firm i that chooses its spot market strategy si aims at




To simplify the derivations, let us focus right away on the symmetric case where all
firms are equally risk averse and have similar marginal costs of production. Given a
forward strategy profile, when I = 1 the equilibrium spot market output of a firm i
solves the first order condition:
sI=1i =
a− c− bxi − b(n− 1)x−i
b(n+ 1) + ρσ2
,
where xi denotes firm i’s forward sales and x−i refers to the forward sales of firms
other than i. In this case, the conditional reduced-form equilibrium profit is
piI=1i = ((b+ ρσ
2)sI=1i + )s
I=1
i + (f − c)xi,
where f , as above, denotes the forward price.
When forward positions of the rival firms are not observable, I = 0, the equilib-
rium spot market output of firm i is given by
sI=0i =
(2b+ ρσ2)(a− c− b(n− 1)xˆ−i) + b2(n− 1)xˆi − b(b(n+ 1) + ρσ2)xi
(2b+ ρσ2)(b(n+ 1) + ρσ2)
,
where xˆi denotes rival firms’ conjecture about the position of firm i, and xˆ−i refers
to the conjectures about the forward positions of firms other than i. The equilibrium
payoff in this case of no observability equals
piI=0i = ((b+ ρσ
2)sI=0i + )s
I=0
i + (f − c)xi. (3.34)
At the forward market stage, a firm i picks its amount of forward sales xi to maximize
its expected utility. The equivalent to the FOC in equation (3.7) is given by∫
ρe−ρpiΛ(·)f()d = 0,
where




2s− bx− (n− 1)b(s+ x) + )
b(n+ 1) + ρσ2
24Notice that the results from maximizing CARA utility coincide with outcomes under the mean-
variance method, since the a firm’s payoff is now normally distributed.
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and where we have imposed the symmetry of equilibrium strategies and the correct-
ness of equilibrium conjectures conditions, i.e. xi = x−i = xˆ−i = xˆ−i. Solving for















Φ ≡ γ(n− 1)2 + (n+ 1)2 + (3(n+ 1)2 − 2γ(n− 1))ρσ
2
b







Building on this expression, we can state the following result.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that firms do not observe the demand shocks before the
spot market opens. Then the inverse hedge ratio of a firm i is deterministic and
given by
Γˆ ≡










b )(γ(n− 1) + ρσ
2




The inverse hedge ratio Γˆ is independent of the demand intercept parameter a and
of the firm marginal cost c, increases in the demand slope parameter b, decreases in
ρ and in σ2, decreases in γ and is (weakly) monotonically decreasing in the number
of firms n.
Compared to the inverse hedge ratios in Proposition 3.1, we see that when spot
market strategies cannot be adapted to accommodate the demand shocks, inverse
hedge ratios are always (weakly) decreasing in the number of players. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. As before, the incentives of a firm to sell forward
are governed by a price effect, a risk-hedging effect and a strategic effect. The price
effect is again constant in the number of firms. Since firms cannot adapt their spot
strategies to demand fluctuations, the risk-hedging effect turns out to be independent
of the number of firms too. In fact, when forward positions are not observable, the
inverse hedge ratios are constant in the number of players:














When the forward market is not totally opaque so that the positions of the firms
are somewhat observable, the strategic commitment role of selling forward leads
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firms to sell a higher output in the forward market the higher the number of players
is. As a result, by the latter effect, inverse hedge ratios fall in n. When the market
is fully transparent, in fact we obtain









which clearly decreases in n.
3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has proposed a methodology to investigate whether oligopolistic firms
sell futures for strategic reasons, for risk-hedging motives, or for both. Our empirical
test builds on a theoretical model of the interaction of risk-averse firms that compete
in futures and spot markets. We find that the effects of an increase in the number of
players on the equilibrium hedge ratio depend on the strategic role played by forward
contracts. If forward sales play no strategic role whatsoever, the inverse hedge ratio
increases as more firms enter the market; otherwise, the hedge ratio decreases. Firms
hedge less if demand is very elastic and, as expected, more risk averse firms have a
greater propensity to hedge. These results serve to structure the empirical research
conducted in the next chapter.
Addressing the question whether firms trade forward for strategic purposes is
relevant from a social point of view. To increase transparency in energy forward
markets, policymakers all over the world have facilitated the creation of organized
exchanges where energy futures can be traded. The costs of operating a futures
market are non-negligible even in a time where virtual market places have displaced
the more traditional physical hubs. In fact, personnel and ICT costs, along with the
insurance and financial costs of dealing with default and other risks involved may
render a marketplace unprofitable. For instance, ENDEX, the Dutch exchange for
power and gas derivatives, has been making losses for 5 out of its 6 or 7 years of ex-
istence.25 When (partly) financed by public funds, loss-making exchanges constitute
a loss for society. If it turns out that firms trade forward contracts strategically, sub-
sidizing a futures market may be validated if futures trade is relatively transparent
and therefore has high commitment value for firms.
Forward markets exist for a number of commodities, including electricity, natu-
ral gas, emission trading permits, copper, iron ore, aluminium, steel etc. Though in
25At the end of 2009, ENDEX was taken over by the APX Group, which owns various platforms
for spot trading of natural gas and electricity in the NL, Belgium and the UK.
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the following chapter we apply our model to the natural gas market in the Nether-
lands, we believe the general message of this chapter is broader. Our insights, and in
particular our methodology to address the question whether firms trade futures for








= − (n+ 1− γ(n− 1))
2bσ2
(bγ(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2)2 < 0,
the inverse hedge ratio decreases as the firm is more risk averse. From this it readily
follows that inverse hedge ratios decrease in the uncertainty of the demand parameter
and increases in slope of the demand. Since
∂Γi
∂γ
= − (n− 1)(b(n+ 1)
2 + 2ρiσ
2)2
2(n+ 1)(bγ(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2)2 < 0,
the inverse hedge ratio decreases in the probability forward positions are observed.




2b(n+ 1)((n+ 1)2 + (n− 1)2γ2 − 2γn(n+ 1))ρiσ2 − b2γ(n+ 1)4 − (2ρiσ2)2
(n+ 1)2(bγ(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2)3 .
Note that ∂Γi/∂n is differentiable w.r.t. γ, which implies that ∂Γi/∂n is continuous


















(b(n2 − 1) + 2ρiσ2)2 < 0,
for all n ≥ 2, b > 0, ρi > 0 and σ2 > 0. Given that ∂Γi/∂n is continuous in γ,
this implies that ∂Γ/∂n = 0 for at least one γ ∈ (0, 1). Further, ∂Γ/∂n = 0 has two
solutions for γ, denoted by γ˜(n) and γ˜2(n):
γ˜(n) ≡ b
2(n+ 1)4 + 4bn(n+ 1)2ρiσ
2 + 4ρ2iσ






2(n+ 1)4 + 4bn(n+ 1)2ρiσ
2 + 4ρ2iσ




4b(n− 1)2(n+ 1)ρiσ2 ,
where Z = b2(n + 1)4 + 4b(n + 1)2(2n − 1)ρiσ2 + 4ρ2iσ4. Now for all n ≥ 2, b > 0,
ρi > 0 and σ
2 > 0, we have:
γ˜2(n) >
2(b(n+ 1)2 + 2ρiσ
2)2 + 4b(n− 1)(n+ 1)2ρiσ2
4b(n− 1)2(n+ 1)ρiσ2
>
2(b(n+ 1)2 + 2ρiσ
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Since γ˜2(n) > 1 and ∂Γi/∂n = 0 for at least one γ ∈ (0, 1), it must be true that













< 0 if γ < γ˜(n) and
∂Γi
∂n
> 0 if γ > γ˜(n). Finally, imposing symmetry
across firms we can readily obtain the equilibrium forward sales of a firm:
xˆ =
2(a− c)(n2 − 1)γ + 2ρσ2b
(n+ 1)((n+ 1)2 + γ(n− 1)2 + 2(1 + γ − n(γ − 3))ρσ2b )
.
Observing the expression in Equation (3.10), it is clear that the variance of the
inverse hedge ratio is σ2/b2(n + 1)2xˆ2, which clearly decreases in a, ρ and σ2, and
increases in c, b and in γ.
